How the financial collapse is understood and dissected
will be of crucial import as Americans draw lessons from the painful experience
we’re now enduring. On the right,
there’s no shortage of pundits who are ready to blame the whole thing,
amazingly enough, on poor people.
After all, they claim, it was giving loans to those who can’t now pay
them back that started this mess, wasn’t it?
If we fall into the trap of believing that kind of
simplistic and misleading claptrap, we stand a good chance of being mired in a
long and stagnant economic mess for years to come. It’s critical that we draw the right lessons from the
collapse. Fortunately, Joseph
Stiglitz, Nobel laureate and former Chairman of the Council of Economic
Advisors, has outlined five crucial causes of the collapse in January’s Vanity
Fair magazine.
Stiglitz’s piece is a very readable tour through the era
of neocon economics—and it shows how a belief in markets over prudence led
inevitably to the meltdown. From
throwing over competent management of our central banking, as Reagan did when
he replaced Paul Volker with Ayn Rand devotee Alan Greenspan, to the refusal of
Greenspan’s Fed and the SEC to regulate the WMDs of economic instruments,
derivatives, Stiglitz makes the case that the belief in market “innovation” as a greater good than prudent regulation sits at the core of our current
disaster.
In addition, the ferocious combination of investment
banking with commercial banks, accomplished by the repeal of Glass-Steagall during the 1990’s, allowed the alpha dogs of investment markets to dominate the financial services sector. This hasty
power shift away from the traditional separation of banking and trading spelled
the demise of an era of financial firewalls, without any real discussion of new
regulations that might have prevented a collapse. To hasten this seismic cultural shift, the SEC decided in
2004 to allow investment banks to increase their debt-to-capital ratio from
12:1 to 30:1 or higher.
Stiglitz points out that during the early part of this decade,
the aftermath of the tech bubble would have ordinarily been a time of serious
economic retrenchment and realignment. Instead, Greenspan hit the gas pedal,
dramatically lowering interest rates.
Simultaneously, Bush’s tax cuts for the rich and a cut in the capital
gains rate led to more “innovative” approaches to real estate speculation and
derivatives trading, at just the moment reasonable people should have been
looking for safer ground during tough times.
Of course, even with all the incentives for the
well-to-do, the stock market wouldn’t have been as attractive an investment if
there hadn’t been for another incentive: the prizes given to top executives who
fudged their numbers with inflated earnings and off-balance-sheet assets. As long as the markets rewarded CEO’s
and other top execs with stock options and huge bonuses, based on constantly
increasing valuations, the incentive to find a way, any way, to inflate
quarterly earnings figures with every report was just too tempting to resist
for many. Go ask Bernie Madoff if you think constant investment gains are easy
to accomplish in the real world.
Finally, we’re in a worse mess because geniuses like Hank
Paulson and the Bush White House wouldn’t take off of their rose-colored
glasses when the whole thing started to crumble. They thought letting Lehman Brothers fail would show the
rest of Wall Street the way to salvation— and that simply giving the taxpayers
a bag of toxic mortgages to hold would fix the problem. They didn’t get it till way too late,
even into the fall of 2008, that the whole scenario was a house of cards and
was tumbling fast. Paulson didn’t realize that letting even one card go was
going to collapse the entire deck.
Paulson’s belief that bad mortgages were identifiably separable from the
complex of indecipherable derivative products based on them and the insurance
swaps that the market was betting on to protect those derivatives was sadly
mistaken.
Even now, the conservatives are still baying at the
markets-are-always-right moon.
They lament that the whole mess goes back to legislation like the
Community Reinvestment Act of 1977, once again attempting to identify the poor
as the problem. They conveniently
forget that CRA loans in low-income neighborhoods have actually defaulted at a
lower rate than other mortgages.
The conservatives are now also constantly repeating the mantra, “Freddie
Mac and Fannie Mae did it,” even though these mortgage lenders are,
surprisingly enough, on better financial footing than most of the Wall Street
finance giants the government hasn’t actually taken over, but merely bailed out
to the tune of $700 billion and counting (see “Fannie Mae’s Last Stand,” also
in Vanity Fair).
No, the mess is far more systemic than the conservatives
would like to pretend. But don’t
think that won’t keep them from continuing to work at rewriting economic
history. They know that a simple
lie, repeated endlessly, grabs more news headlines than a complex truth. So they’ll be busy shaping simple
slogans for the press and looking for demons in all the usual places. The challenge for journalists and
observers seeking real answers will be to ask themselves, “Are these the same
guys we listened to before the collapse”
Since
the meltdown (and before it), observers like Stiglitz, Daniel Roubini, Paul
Krugman, and other critical thinkers have done an excellent job of doing
forsenic accounting on the decades-long American deregulatory experiment. We need to take their advice and learn
from the mistakes that were made in the name of a convenient combination of
conservative ideology and economic self-interest for the most powerful. Once we begin to take serious stock of
how the supercapitalists got us where we are, it will be easier to make
decisions on a rational basis about how we want to go forward into the
post-collapse future.