Glenn Greenwald has been on a writing tear ever since the NY Times ran David Bartow’s excellent April 20 dissection of how the Administration manipulated military talking heads in the media regarding Iraq. Greenwald has another good post up today about the story.
One of the perplexing questions that arise when the country’s leading newspaper runs a huge story on such a sophisticated and devious scheme, complete with life and death consequences— and then virtually no one picks it up… is to ask whether anyone cares— or whether Americans now just expect stuff like this— and therefore simply aren’t surprised or interested. I suspect there’s an element of both of these answers to the question— and some other memes responsible as well.
1) The television networks are most defensive about the Times story and least likely to give it play, since they are most heavily implicated in the deception it unveils. It is largely a consequence of their lack of vetting of military analysts that such a program could be so effective.
2) Many Americans, fed so much tit-for-tat media over the years, have forgotten that information isn’t all spin anyway— and so might think the Administration feeds us their line because that’s its job. The differences between political persuasion and a complex deception are not yet visible to many citizens, especially if they already don’t care to be challenged over the veracity of their assumptions.
3) Many of us who DO care about the manipulation of ‘experts’ over Iraq now are so overwhelmingly cynical in our expectations of the Bush Administration that we no longer gin up much outrage over new revelations of its extent. As Scott Collins wrote in the LA Times blog:
…many Americans, confronted with evidence that
TV's talking heads are taking orders not just from
government officials but also military-contractor
clients, can be excused for not being all that
surprised. That is the price we pay for having a
government that's not afraid to use sophisticated –
and often brazenly misleading -- PR tactics.
4) The Barstow story is COMPLICATED. This is a big problem for most newspapers and all television programs. Remember that CBS had to get Papal dispensation to run a three-minute story on the Watergate money way back in the seventies, since the flow of Republican CREEP cash was such a difficult thing to explain with only pretty pictures. We can’t expect, with all the changes for the worse in media ownership since then, that the Barstow story will command the same amount of time from corporate news management as Woodward and Bernstein’s work did, unless the story itself becomes a hot product.
With all the above working against the dissemination of information about how the war machine has been spinning its tales, we are left with new media as the only reasonable way to rail against mainstream silence. The blogosphere, led by writers like Greenwald, needs to keep pointing out the story and its consequences. It may not be likely for it to catch fire with the public, but without the blogosphere, military analysts maintained by the Pentagon and rewarded by the mainstream media for their conflicts of interest and spoon-fed conclusions have no reason to expose the psy-op that was used against them, and through them, against us all.
I’d like to point out that within the media, NPR’s On the Media ran a good piece on the Barstow story and suggest that readers listen to it. I’d also suggest that we keep up with Greenwald’s battle to make the networks account for their use of analysts who were either advocates for the Iraq operation from its infancy— or were so beholden to Pentagon spin and to their military contractor clients winning big deals to support the effort— that they were useless as objective commentators.
This story, in the context of the Plamegate scandal and what we know from sources as varied and conservative as Paul O’Neill and the MI6’s Richard Dearlove, points to an operation to foment and justify war against Iraq that preceeded 9/11—and was likely a goal from the outset of the Bush Administration. It isn’t going to be possible for the US to unravel itself from Iraq now without the public better understanding how we got in—and weaning itself off the the same experts who now tell us we must stay for another decade, if necessary.