General Antonio Taguba, a career Army officer, knew when he was assigned to investigate abuse and torture at the dreaded Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq that the job wouldn’t do much for his chances for promotion. What he wasn’t prepared for was just how far those above him in the Pentagon would go to avoid responsibility for the violations of basic military law he would uncover.
Seymour Hersh writes in this week’s New Yorker about the reception Taguba received after his report was leaked to the media. Here's an excerpt:
Taguba was met at the door of the conference
room by an old friend, Lieutenant General
Bantz J. Craddock, who was Rumsfeld’s senior
military assistant. Craddock’s daughter had
been a babysitter for Taguba’s two children
when the officers served together years earlier
at Fort Stewart, Georgia. But that afternoon,
Taguba recalled, “Craddock just said, very
coldly, ‘Wait here.’ ” In a series of interviews
early this year, the first he has given, Taguba
told me that he understood when he began the
inquiry that it could damage his career; early
on, a senior general in Iraq had pointed out to
him that the abused detainees were “only
Iraqis.” Even so, he was not prepared for the
greeting he received when he was finally
ushered in.
“Here . . . comes . . . that famous General
Taguba—of the Taguba report!” Rumsfeld
declared, in a mocking voice. The meeting was
attended by Paul Wolfowitz, Rumsfeld’s deputy;
Stephen Cambone, the Under-Secretary of
Defense for Intelligence; General Richard
Myers, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
(J.C.S.); and General Peter Schoomaker, the
Army chief of staff, along with Craddock and
other officials. Taguba, describing the moment
nearly three years later, said, sadly, “I thought
they wanted to know. I assumed they wanted to
know. I was ignorant of the setting.”
In the meeting, the officials professed
ignorance about Abu Ghraib. “Could you tell us
what happened?” Wolfowitz asked. Someone
else asked, “Is it abuse or torture?” At that
point, Taguba recalled, “I described a naked
detainee lying on the wet floor, handcuffed, with
an interrogator shoving things up his rectum,
and said, ‘That’s not abuse. That’s torture.’
There was quiet.”
Rumsfeld was particularly concerned about how
the classified report had become public.
“General,” he asked, “who do you think leaked
the report?” Taguba responded that perhaps a
senior military leader who knew about the
investigation had done so. “It was just my
speculation,” he recalled. “Rumsfeld didn’t say
anything.” (I did not meet Taguba until mid-
2006 and obtained his report elsewhere.)
Rumsfeld also complained about not being
given the information he needed. “Here I am,”
Taguba recalled Rumsfeld saying, “just a
Secretary of Defense, and we have not seen a
copy of your report. I have not seen the
photographs, and I have to testify to Congress
tomorrow and talk about this.” As Rumsfeld
spoke, Taguba said, “He’s looking at me. It was
a statement.”
At best, Taguba said, “Rumsfeld was in denial.”
Denial indeed. Rumsfeld, the most hands-on Secretary of Defense in memory, was not likely to be in the dark about what had been going on.
Later, Taguba was told by a senior general that he’d be investigated himself, as would his report. Finally, he was told to resign, or presumably face worse. This would ultimately be the price of making an honest effort to find out the truth about the violations at Abu Ghraib.
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